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LESSONS OF AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES 
by 
Roy A. Chandler 
University of Wales-Cardiff 
against the auditors-£400,000 in L&G 
and £80,000 in KCM, though these were 
reduced dur ing the course of the 
litigation. 
» The auditors were Chartered Accountants, 
professional men, not as in the earlier case 
of Leads Estate, Building and Investment 
Co. (1887 Ch. D. , 36, 787) which 
involved an unskilled amateur. 
• Both were heard in the first instance 
before Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams. 
• Two of the appellate judges were the same 
in each case, Lindley, L. J. and Lopes, L. J., 
(with Rigby L. in L&G, and Kay, L. in 
KCM). 
• Both auditors appeared to have placed too 
much reliance on management ' s 
judgement regarding the values of assets, 
customer accounts in the case of L&G and 
stock and fixed assets in the case of KCM. 
Introduction 
Just over a century ago, in 1892, L. R. 
Dicksee in the first edition of his book, 
Auditing, indicated the lack of agreement 
among accountants as to the precise nature of 
their responsibilities for auditing company 
accounts due in part to the paucity of legal 
decisions in cases involving auditors. Within 
a short space of t ime, the quest ion of 
auditors' responsibilities appeared to have 
been answered in two decisions handed 
down by the Court of Appeal: In re The 
London and General Bank (Acct. L. R. 1895, 
173; henceforth L&G) and In re The Kingston 
Cotton Mill Co. (Acct. L. R. 1896, 77; 
henceforth KCM). These two cases were 
quickly established in the professional 
l i te ra ture and case law and today are 
frequently cited in arguments before the 
courts , e.g. in Galoo v. Bright Grahame 
Murray, (WLR 1994, 1360). Although the 
two Victorian cases share many similarities, 
they have opposite outcomes: in L&G the 
auditors were held liable for dividends 
improperly paid, whereas in KCM, the 
auditors escaped liability. 
The similarities of the cases are: 
• The actions were brought by the Official 
Receiver alleging misfeasance under the 
Companies (Winding Up) Act 1890. 
• Both began with a substant ial claim 
Brief reviews 
L&G was closely connected with the 
Balfour group of companies—in fact it was 
established that the sole purpose of the bank 
was to support other group companies. The 
bank's profits were inflated over the course of 
several years by the inclusion as income of 
interest on loans which was never received. 
KCM was a cotton spinning company 
whose profits had been overstated through 
continued on page 22 
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the deliberate manipulations of the stock 
figure by the Managing Director. The value 
of fixed assets had also been overstated since 
no allowance had been made for depreciation. 
The reliance on management is evident 
in both cases. In the L&G case, the auditors 
including Theobald, a chartered accountant, 
had been alarmed at the condition of some of 
the bank's debtors' accounts. They had made 
a special report to the directors 
recommending that given the conditions no 
dividend should be paid. They also proposed 
to warn the shareholders of this report. They 
were persuaded mainly by Balfour to change 
this report on his assurance that he would 
report: to the shareholders at the general 
meeting. They sought to cover themselves 
by inserting in their report to shareholders a 
rather cryptic comment that the "value of 
the assets was dependent on realisation." 
Balfour did not honour his alleged promise 
to inform the shareholders dur ing the 
general meeting, at which the auditors were 
present but did nothing. 
The posit ion of the KCM auditors, 
Peasegood and Pickering, is quite different. 
They knew nothing. They were not even 
remotely suspicious of the stock 
manipulations although the stock figure had 
increased substantially and the gross profit 
percentage had increased dramatically in a 
short space of time. The auditors simply 
accepted the values of stock as computed by 
the managing director. Al though they 
claimed to have tested the "casts" of the 
stock sheets and summaries, they could 
provide no proof of this. In their defense, 
they argued that stock was a technical area 
beyond the expertise which could reasonably 
be expected of auditors, and therefore, they 
were ent i t led to rely on management 's 
certificate of the stock figure. 
How then is one to reconcile these 
contradictory decisions? From a legal point 
of view, the only apparent explanation lies 
in the degree of honesty in reporting the 
audit findings. In L&G the auditors had 
performed what appears to be an adequate 
audit, at least in terms of discovering the 
true state of the bank's customers' accounts. 
But they failed to make a full report to the 
shareholders . In KCM, the audi tors 
appeared to have performed a perfunctory 
audit, at least in regard to stock, but they 
reported honestly. Herein lies the anomaly 
of the two decisions: a thorough audit may 
produce results which should be 
communicated to shareholders, and the 
auditor will be liable if he does not give an 
honest report; an auditor who performs a 
mechanical audit is less likely to unearth 
conditions of which shareholders deserve to 
be made aware, and therefore, there is less 
chance of being subjected to management 
pressure. An auditor in these circumstances 
will find it easier to produce an "honest" 
report. 
The nature of the accounting errors 
provides no p laus ib le reason for the 
different j u d g e m e n t s . The a rgumen t s 
before the court concerning the technical 
nature of stock in a manufacturing company 
could have been made in the context of the 
banking case where it is undoubtedly a 
ski l led job to assess the credi t risk of 
different types of business, the solvency of 
cus tomers , and the value of securi t ies 
provided (as acknowledged by a 
contemporary writer in The Juridical Review, 
1901, p. 104). The auditors of L&G tackled 
these technicalities and ascertained the true 
posit ion, whereas the auditors of KCM 
simply relied on management. Although 
other sources of evidence were available, for 
example, a Stock Journal which if analyzed 
would have shown the discrepancy in the 
physical volumes of book stock and reported 
stock. In add i t ion it is clear from 
contributions to The Accountant that some 
of its readers thought that there were other 
warning signs which should have put the 
audi tor upon enquiry. The signif icant 
change in gross profit percentage and the 
stock turnover ratio seemed to be matters 
which the auditor should have investigated. 
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Although valid reasons for these observed 
changes could have been advanced, there is 
no indication that the auditor called for any 
explanations. 
An alternative explanation may be the 
question of public policy. Did the Balfour 
connection condemn the auditor in L&G? 
The collapse of the Balfour group sent 
ripples through the city and concern among 
investing classes. KCM was not nearly so 
large an enterprise, and there may have been 
less pressure on the judiciary to pander to 
public sentiment. However, it is difficult to 
prove or disprove this possibility. 
Conclusion 
These two cases did not really help the 
profession in its a t tempts to clarify its 
responsibilities. However, some of the dicta 
have withstood the test of time. The lesson 
from L&G is that auditors should report 
honestly—a point which was readily taken on 
board in the literature although doubt exists 
even now as to whether auditors have 
sufficient independence to go against 
management and to make an honest report. 
In terms of the extent of audit fieldwork, 
the signals from the cases are less clear. In 
L&G it was said that the auditors should go 
beyond the books of account, which they did; 
they examined securities for the bank's loans. 
But in KCM it seemed sufficient to rely on a 
certificate from management; no further 
checks were performed and no analytical 
procedures were employed in order to get 
audit evidence. It is hard to rationalize the 
different stances of the same court. Was it 
that the court sought to punish the auditor 
who knew more than he reported and to be 
lenient to the auditor who reported honestly 
albeit on an inadequate job or were there 
policy factors involved? 
The reaction of practit ioners to the 
cases, so far as may be judged from 
correspondence reproduced in The Accountant, 
was that the KCM auditor was deserving of 
less sympathy from his peers, though this 
was mingled with some relief for the 
protection which the decision appeared to 
give auditors. On the other hand the L&G 
decision was viewed by some as harsh. The 
uncertain outcome of l i t iga t ion was to 
continue throughout the present century and 
is one factor in the reluctance of auditors and 
their insurers to pursue legal action 
preferring instead to settle out-of-court. 
MONOGRAPHS AVAILABLE 
The Academy of Accounting Historians announces the publication of Monograph 
No. 7 of its Monograph Series, Wolodymyr Motyka's Bibliography of Russian Language 
Publications on Accounting 1736-1917, Vol. 1 (1736-1900) and Vol. 2 (1901-1917). There 
is a critical introduction contained in each volume which indexes works on accounting 
published in Tsarist Russia chronologically, thematically, and by author. The set also 
contains a glossary and list of sources of main listings. The monograph is published by 
Garland Publishing and priced at $132.00. 
The Academy also has copies of Monograph No. 6, published in 1991 to honor Dr. 
Paul Garner. The monograph, entitled, The Costing Heritage: Studies in Honor of S. Paul 
Garner, is edited by O. Finley Graves of The University of Mississippi. The monograph 
is priced at $15 for individual members and $20 for institutional affiliates. Orders and 
inquiries for Monograph No. 6 should be made to: Doris M. Cook, The Academy of 
Accounting Historians, Department of Accounting, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, 
Arkansas, 72701, USA. 
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